We contend that a tendency toward cooperative behavior in humans was magni…ed by humans dealing with one another in trade and in joint activity such as big game hunting. Relative specialization by task (division of labor) provided a setting for trade to be gainful to all traders. Humans agglomerated to take advantage of specialization and trade. We also re‡ect on situations in which only some sort of negotiation or bargaining will allow joint-tasks to get carried out.
Introduction
In Hartwick (2010) I argued that division of labor, as in relative specialization by task by say two individuals, can yield positive payo¤s to each "specialist" after trade has taken place between the individuals and this general "procedure", relative specialization and trade is intellectually challenging and is thus "skill" enhancing in the long term. Villagers who specialize and trade among themselves should become smarter along certain lines of mental acuity over time. Specialization and trade is, in our view, a powerful force for encephalization. A more e¤ective division of labor and more e¤ective trade will make the community a more productive unit, almost all persons ending up with more meat and tubers than each would get without specialization and trade, but the members of the village will also be becoming smarter and more open to more re…ned specializations and exchanges. It is not hugely di¢ cult to argue for a selection process at work here: individuals who are good at specialization and trade will be selected for in the long run and these individuals will "end up with" certain enhanced mental capacities and emotional tendencies, qualities associated with pro-social behaviors.
1 There can be unfair exchanges between individuals and we discuss these below. High quality social behavior is not only about interacting productively with others but also about avoiding interactions with others that may lead to con ‡ict. Learning to trade involves learning to avoid engaging in haggling with individuals who have traded unfairly in the past.
A second point I made, albeit awkwardly in detail, is that very basic economics has inherent in it a theory "favoring" specialization in activity by individuals, as distinct from multi-tasking by individuals or diversifying e¤ort over multiple tasks. Given an inherent tendency for specialization by individuals, trade among individuals becomes a natural "extension", and enhanced "productivity" for bands of individuals that support trade within their "borders" follows. Of course trade among individuals is more productive when the individuals are physically near one another. That is, trade is more productive when transportation costs can be avoided. Thus clustering among individuals with distinct skills is the natural mode of social organization. This is distinct from the advantages of clustering for mutual defense, a powerful force for seeing families join together in villages. We expand on this below. And thirdly, we turn to some detail on the subject of task-sharing as in say the hunting of big game by a group of villagers. The large question under consideration here is how the primate, Homo sapiens, came to be so di¤erent from other primates along the scale of cooperative behavior. How much more cooperative is the average Homo sapiens relative to a great ape and how did such a behavior emerge?
Our agenda is then to take up some basics of division of labor (relative specialization in task by di¤erent individuals) 2 and interpersonal trade; to take up some foundations of relative specialization by individuals; and …nally to discuss joint tasking by individuals in say big game hunting.
1 https://www.britannica.com/topic/division-of-labour ... the division of labour (job specialization) may have been responsible for starting the human conquest of nature and di¤erentiating human beings from other animal species.
2 Division of labor is a term associated with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. He argued that many more pins per worker could be produced in a factory if each worker specialized in one distinct bit of the production of a pin and passed his "output" on to another worker for another distinct bit of production to be "added on", in an assembly-line fashion instead of each worker producing a complete pin on her own. Specialization by task for a product involving many distinct steps in production will in general be highly productive. Production of a pin by a worker in isolation involves foregoing the gains from specialization in a sub-task, and the slicing up of the production process among many individuals with marginally di¤erent skills.
Preliminaries
Much study of human children doing certain tasks has been to compare "results" with those related to apes engaged in similar activities. Michael Tomasello has been a leader in setting up and reporting on many of these experiments. The issue is why human children do better in many essentially socially-oriented (cooperative) activities. If humans have a much larger capacity for productive social interactions than do apes, what are the roots of this superiority? Human brains are larger. Humans are smarter along many dimensions. How did they get that way and is their superior intelligence, of particular dimensions, related to more productive social interacting? To what extent did more productive social interacting of humans lead to more brain development in humans? What is the role of language in the development of advanced social interacting by humans? Experts who have carried out experiments in testing for superior social interactions among children are fairly agnostic on the fundamental question of when and how humans broke away from their primate cousins and developed more consistent and productive social interacting. Tomasello (2009; p. 85) remarks: "In Mothers and Others, Sarah Hrdy argues that this changed social context (of shared child rearing by females in a village), which may have arisen due to differences in the way humans needed to forage and the monogamous relationships between females and males, created humans' unique pro-social motivations." Hrdy in fact leaves monogamy out of her theory; she emphasizes that female humans developed a tendency to share infant care and child supervision and this "cooperative breeding" fostered in children an ability to read the minds of others. This sharing of a point of view became the root of social understanding and the ability to cooperate in a variety of activities. She is dismissive of Charles Darwin's famous assertion: In a monogamous relationship, "the most able men succeeded best in defending and providing for themselves and their wives and o¤spring" and the o¤spring of these superior men were most likely to survive and reproduce. (Darwin (1871; p. 389 )) The words monogamy and division of labor do not appear in the appendix to her large monograph.
"Tomasello argues that the unique features of human cognition are rooted in an evolved, species-speci…c capacity and motivation for shared intentionality that gives rise to distinctive kinds of communication and joint action." (p. 155) "From this capacity spring all of our distinctive achievements, from tool use to mathematics to symbols." (p. 156). Spelke 3 , in commenting on Tomasello's lectures puts things di¤erently. She argues that "Shared intentionality may well be an integrated system (for a two year old) but is it the keystone of human uniqueness or is this communicative system constructed -like tools, natural numbers, and symbolic maps -from a capacity that is more fundamental still, and that operates by conjoining preexisting core systems of knowledge through the use of language?" (Spelke, p. 169, in Tomasello (2009) ). Reading cues for trustworthiness can be viewed as complementary to practicing shared intentionality.
Tomasello uses the expression "division of labor" …ve times in his lectures. He sees division of labor as a later "product" of evolving human social behavior. Our point is that division of labor will deepen over long stretches of time as villagers become more sophisticated at "balancing values in exchanges" and in assessing fellow traders for relative fairness in exchanges. Of course as the human brain develops over long periods, we expect humans to employ their time and e¤ort more e¤ectively or to practice "division of labor" more productively. Central here is the idea that division of labor and trade contribute to brain development along certain dimensions and better division of labor and trade made a village a more productive unit, a unit with members able to consume more food and leisure. Many observers have argued that the pairing of mature males and females in monogamous relationships would involve some division of labor as with the male being a hunter and provider and the female being a gatherer, food preparer and carer for their o¤spring. "One speculation about how "shared cooperative activities" arose in human evolution ... is that in the context of foraging for food (both hunting and gathering), humans were forced to become cooperators in a way that other primates were not." (p. 99, Tomasello) Spelke argues that all children are born with "systems of core knowledge". "These are systems for representing and reasoning about (1) inanimate, material objects and their motions, (2) intentional agents and their goal-directed actions, (3) places in the navigable environment and their geometric relations to one another (4) set of objects or events and their numerical relationships of ordering and arithmetic, and (5) social partners who engage with the infant in reciprocal interactions." These core capacities get expanded with a child's acquisition of natural language. And some of these core capacities are shared to a less extent by other primates and other animals. Spelke attempts to link the established "systems of core knowledge" to Tomasello's arguements about innate "shared intentionality", the root of cooperative behaviors in humans. She raises issues about the age of the manifestation of shared intentionality in small children and about its connections to her established "systems of core knowledge". She resists presenting strong conclusions and endorses more experimentation with children along the lines that Tomasello has favored.
We can I think usefully discuss the hard-wiring of shared intentionality, a very weak form of cooperative behavior in humans. It has been established that shared intentionality, say having a "partner" look in the direction one is pointing, is signi…cantly weak in apes. Can we infer that humans are hard-wired for shared intentionality? Consider the experiment many have done in raising a newborn wolf by hand by humans in the hope that the mature creature will be dog-like and not too savage. All such initiatives have been failures. We infer that mature wolves are hard-wired for savage behavior. Humans must in turn be hard-wired for cooperative behavior and apes 4 not be, when guaged on a comparable scale. There is however probably no point in searching for a cooperation gene in humans just as there is no point in searching for a savagery gene in wolves. 5 The behaviors of interest are complicated and must depand on a module of genes or a suite of genes that are almost impossible to isolate and to link to one another.
6 This is to say that, with Tomasello, we believe in inherent human capacities to cooperate with others and these capacities show up in measurable ways around age one year. Complications arise when we set out to measure the degree of cooperation and type of cooperation in humans relative to apes. The theory of mind is a statement that some creatures are able to put themselves in the shoes of another and to adjust their behavior in accord with their "reading" of the mental states of others. The large question is the degree of "reading" the mind of a "partner". Humans appear in contrast with apes to perform strongly in "reading the mind of others". It is presumably this capacity that unlocks the capacity to cooperate in joint activities, activities that leave each participant feeling better as in a successful hunt for big game. It makes much sense to search for the roots of "shared intentionality" but once we acknowledge that humans have this capacity, we can re ‡ect on how shared intentionality is linked to more complicated instances of cooperative behavior.
Let us summarize before moving on. At some point, say four hundred thousand years ago, a chance mutation or a signi…cant environmental shift resulted in early human females sharing infant and child raising in new mutualistic modes 4 Many experiments have been done with chimpanzees. Technically a chimpanzee is an ape and we proceed to use the term ape when chimpanzees were involved. In some cases the apes in question were not chimpanzees. 5 Recall the striking experiments of Dmitry Belyaev in selective breeding of foxes. With each generation he carefully bred docile with docile and savage with savage. Within twenty generations he found he was dealing with relatively domesticated animals in one group. It would be of great interest if certain cooperative behaviors could be bred for in chimpanzees with Belyaev-type experiments.
6 Richard Wrangham, Adam Wilkins and Tecumseh Fitch have recently suggested that homo sapiens is essentially a domesticated version of neanderthals. They argue that domestication in mammals involves changes to the neural crest, a collection of stem cells in a developing embryo. They believe that evidence involving the neural crest in human embryos will turn up in support of their hypothesis. This leaves open of course how the domestication got started and how it was induced to move forward at the pace it did. Females may have shown a preference for less violent males. Wrangham and Brian Hare have suggested elsewhere that sexual selection may account for bonobos being less violent of the apes. See Barras (2018) for an overview of this important new material.
7 Meredith Crawford developed the pair-wise collaboration experiment for chimpanzees in 1937. Success in the activity required that one monkey get another to pull on a rope so that together they were able to access a food source. Some chimps succeeded in pair-wise "collaboration" while others failed. It also turned out that a collaborator often exerted less e¤ort in pulling on her rope than one might expect. (Tomasllo (Silk (p. 115) ).
with other females. This new mode of sharing was substantially di¤erent from that observed in ape communities. Human children evolved under this new communal-raising system to be good "mind readers". Shared intentionality took root among members of human bands. Separately perhaps monogamy took root and a male partner gravitated to foraging for food for his family while the female partner engaged in childcare and some gathering as distinct from hunting. The extent of the division of labor between husband-wife pairs became quite di¤erent from that observable between males and females in communities of apes. To this day much "allocation" including that for sexual partners takes place by dominance "relations" in communities of apes. The strongest move …rst. Bullying is the standard way things get allocated for the most part. Humans it seems came to know shared intentionality, relative monogamy and division of labor between husbands and wives. It remained for humans to re…ne these tendencies via natural selection, to learn wider uses for division of labor and the basics of trading fairly with one another. This was a long evolutionary process, obviously much aided presumably much later by the use of language by humans and our ability to construct our contemporary modern culture, comprehensively viewed, is the outcome. We are primates who can build 130 storey buildings, build rockets that can allow us to explore other planets, and to build experiments and detectors that allow us to understand how matter and space are precisely related in a systematic scheme. We get satisfaction from well-told stories and beautiful music. We develop legislatures, legal systems and business corporations.
It seems that monogamy and division of labor between male and female partners are relevant to the study of social development in humans for Hrdy but these behaviors came well after pro-social re ‡exes were rooted in humans. Hrdy might remark that many non-human creatures pair o¤ in relatively monogamous relationships and the males and females specialize in di¤erent tasks as o¤spring are raised and yet still have displayed almost no further development of the capacity for productive social interaction. Humans needed something in addition to relatively monogamous pairing and task-sharing for the development of o¤spring, and Hrdy argues for "cooperative breeding" being the missing element. Tomasello indicates: "It is a startling fact that among all of the great apes species except humans, the mother provides basically 100 percent of childcare. Among humans across traditional and modern societies, the average is closer to 50 percent." (p. 147). How this cooperative breeding behavior developed is not entirely obvious but it seems like a reasonable specialization of humans that could be the foundation for the substantial pro-social capacity of humans. Much subsequent evolution of pro-social behaviors is needed to take early humans without language or large brains to reach the high levels of social capacities that humans have drawn upon over the last twenty or thirty thousand years. Our central observation is that division of labor (relative specialization in tasks by di¤erent individuals) and interpersonal trade would be powerful forces for expanding social capacities in humans. Encephalization is largely a post "cooperative breeding" phenomenon in our view.
We turn now to trade or exchange between individuals and suggest that getting fair interpersonal trade going is highly brian-power enhancing for participants. Encephalization has been in part driven by social interactions of humans and some types of interactions have contributed to making humans smart along certain dimensions over evolutionary time.
Fair Trade and Encephalization
Let us …rst consider "fair trade" between two individuals from the perspective of economics. The so-called Edgeworth 8 Box construction formalizes "the gaining from trade freely entered into" between two individuals. Brenda arrives with 10 apples and 2 books and Arthur has 2 apples and 6 books. See the point in question at the end of the lens in the box in Figure 1 . This point represents the pre-trade point for the two persons. Trade involves person A giving up some apples in exchange for some books (B gives up some books for some apples) so that the trading pair ends up at a point INSIDE the lens-shaped area in Figure 1 . The two curves set out in Figure  1 de…ning the lens are referred to as A's indi¤erence curve and B's indi¤erence curve respectively. When trade ends, the lens has shrunk to a point (the two initial curves are replaced by two similar curves that are now tangent to one another). "Fair trade" can be associated with A and B each ending up on a higher (newly inserted, not drawn) indi¤erence curve, at a point INSIDE the original lens. Brenda might end up with 8 apples and 4 books and Arthur with 4 apples and 4 books. In "unfair trade", in contrast the lens disappears as above but one person ends up ON THE BOUNDARY of the original lens. The "loser" in trade ends up on his or her initial indi¤erence curve or with her initial pre-trade level of satisfaction. In this bullying scenario he or she entered a trading relationship in which ONLY ONE PERSON ended up with more satisfaction ex post, or with a bundle of apples and books that yielded increased satisfaction. Trade has done nothing to make the "loser" more satis…ed with his or her post-trade bundle. Entering a trading relationship was agreed upon, freely entered into, but only one person bene…tted after the "re-allocation" of initial holdings via exchange. Such unfair trade would presumably leave the one who gained no increased satisfaction aggrieved. Each trader ending up gaining some satisfaction is not a complicated scenario. One might argue that unfair trade is the more unusual situation.
"From a distance", trade can be viewed here as part of a larger learning for participants about calculation and fairness, lessons in the calculation of "balance" of satisfactions, or a resonable quid for quo. And of course the participants learn who is not a bully in a trading relationship. Reputations would be being made. Stronger communities would have selected for individuals who were good at "fair trade". Keeping track of individuals who were reasonable in trade would involve …ne-tuning of certain parts of the brains of individuals. Trading would select for brain improvement along certain dimensions. Trading certainly involves a selection of individuals who others can trust, broadly de…ned. Trade can re-inforce and expand an individual's small endowment of "shared intentionality". Trade makes particular sense between two individuals with distinct skills as in hunting 9 by one and gathering tubers by another. Trade allows each individual with a relative skill advantage to exercise that advantage more fully or to specialize to the bene…t of each prospective trader. 9 Chimpanzees in the Tai Forest of Cote d'Ivoire collaborate in hunting red colobus monkeys. Some chimps chase the prey and others place themselves to block certain escape routes. argues that this is a kind of default "collaboration" in which each participant is hoping to be the one to actually make the kill. Wolves and lions also hunt in packs in a somewhat analogous fashion, he notes. We might refer to it as coordinated activity grounded in instinct, rather than in explicit collaboration.
Reciprocating favors across di¤erent dates is presumably a very tricky behavior to learn and to internalize. For example if one mother asks her neighbor to look after her child for an hour, the helping friend will be more willing to assist if she can count on some reciprocal assistance at a later date. In addition there is the question of the magnitude of the favor. A large favor (looking after a friend's child for an afternoon) should be responded to with a favor of comparable value. It is presumably this sort of behavior that has been developed in humans and not in other primates. Reciprocity and fair valuation are the distinguishing features of "human cooperation". Trust is a term which in part characterizes these aspects of bonding behavior. We contend that these relatively novel behaviors (reciprociaty and fair valuation) can be learned and presumably be selected for more successfully in certain environments. Helping with child care is a good basic starting point. Mutual support in hunting large game is another good place for learning the basics of cooperation and reciprocity. An environment with much tit for tat is needed for learning and selection to develop. As we have noted the most rudimentary tit for tat setting is when a partner will forage for his or her family when the other is pre-occupied with childcare. Each partner learns to depend on the other. The extension is protection of the family. One partner is often willing to defend the nest while the other is immobilized with child-care duties. This is straightforward. The leap in mutally supportive behavior, so to speak, is to mutual assistance between unrelated individuals. Silk (pp. 119-120) has observed interesting aspects of reciprocity in her studies of mutual grooming by female baboons. "Grooming is mainly directed toward reciprocating partners, often close kin. Grooming is frequently imbalanced within single interactions, as one female may groom her partner considerably more than she is groomed in return on that day. However, over the course of many interactions, these imbalances generally even out. Female baboons form the strongest ties to females with whom they have the most equitable grooming relationships. The most equitable relationships also last the longest."
The Extent of Specialization in a Village
Consider the proposition: more specialization by distinct individuals in their current tasks yields more output for the community. The basic trade model of David Ricardo 10 has in it a property related to this proposition. Consider three unrelated individuals with di¤erent abilities to carry out hunting and gathering, distinct activities. Per week, we can represent how much they produce for each of these activities along the x and y axes of a triangle. Each person has her own An equilibrium for dedicated devotion to one of two tasks and trade ex post correponds to a "…nal point" on the outer right-hand boundary. Such a point is generally associated with a downward, left to right, straight line tangent to the outer right-hand boundary. One point gets "picked out" by the tangency condition, a point capturing essentially relative tastes of the three individuals for bundles of the two goods. Observe that tangency can occur at a vertex (complete specialization in "production" by each individual before trade) or along a " ‡at" (specialization by JUST two persons and non-specialization or diversi…cation in production activity by the third person (the one whose hypotenuse corresponds to the tangency ‡at)). Of our three persons then, at most a SINGLE person can be in a diversi…cation position, doing both hunting and gathering tubers. Two or more will be left completely specialized in production or task-assignment.
We have then a complete picture of task-assignment essentially by the "free market" for three individuals, each with somewhat di¤erent skill endowments. Our diagrammatic construction extends naturally to four persons or many more than four. And our three person narrative remains true for 145 persons. At most only one will ever end up "multi-tasking" in a specialization and trade equilibrium. The central point here is that the Ricardian framework for characterizing how diverse individuals in a pre-industrial village are connected indicates that SPECIALIZATION by task in the natural state "of equilibrium". And the narrative turns on each individual bringing slightly di¤erent initial skill endowments to the system, the village "task-assignment" and trade equilibrium. The Ricardian model has within it, the property of relative specialization by task and this becomes part of the cement that joins the individuals together in a community as distinct from a collection of isolated individuals.
11 And of course trade works better when one's partner is near at hand or when search and transportation costs can be kept very low. Dense living arrangements make specialization and trade more productive. This is a powerful force for having people in a village rather than in dispersed families. This force for agglomeration is distinct from the advantage of agglomerating for defence of one's family.
Joint Input to a Task
A central idea in The Wealth of Nations was that if each producer and consumer was guided by his or her self-interest, essentially taking local prices as …xed signals or guideposts for directing his or her activities, then the aggregate of all agents would constitute a system operating very satisfactorily, operating in fact 1 1 Our relative skill endowment for two possible tasks per person is a triangle and the placement of the hypotenuse is crucial to the representation of skill. An extended model would have each person's hypotenuse bowed out somewhat. Equilibrium would then end up with many persons devoting some of their labor to each possible task as in multi-tasking.
as if an invisible hand were doing the allocation of ‡ows of inputs and outputs "around" the economy highly e¢ ciently. A society functions very well then under the doctrine of decentralized decision-making and a free-standing price system. This view acquired a mathematical con…rmation (a "proof") in Arrow and Debreu (1954) . There is then a sense that The Wealth of Nations was in large part a tract centered on the idea that a well-functioning society should be built on the doctrine of each person pursuing self-interest freely within a price system. Decision-making would be decentralized. Individuals would be connected to one another in a system, oblivious to an implicit sort of cooperation that was prevailing. Explicit cooperative behavior could be the foundation for another type of society (Karl Marx's communism?), but Smith and other Enlightenment philosophers were not interested in elucidating how an alternative system might work. They were interested in systems that allowed self-interest and decentralized decision-making to ‡ourish.
Leading economists commenced "attacks" on the idea that the price system worked ‡awlessly, after Arrow and Debreu's article was published. Behavior in the face of uncertainty in insurance markets (Arrow (1964) ) and preference revelation for government services (Samuelson (1954) 12 ) were two new topics that could not be shoe-horned into the framework of a well-functioning decentralized decision-making system. And in the 1970s another problem in allocation by price, principal-agent analysis emerged. We illustrate. Consider a land owner who has a tenant farmer. The tenant knows about the particular details of working her particular farm better than the owner, one step removed, and the principal wants to defend his prospective pro…t from di¢ cult-to-detect shirking by the agent. What sort of a contract should be developed so that the principal ends up with a high pro…t stream and has made him or herself relatively immune from any di¢ cult-to-detect shirking? With a round of poor pro…ts, the principal becomes uncertain whether bad weather is responsible or low e¤ort by the agent. A contract must cover this sort of confusion that can arise. A contract is serving to allocate e¤ort and pro…t in the absence of a price mechanism. Essentially a contract is required to get the tenant working with an intensity satisfactory to the principal. Principal-agent analysis is about inducing a sort of cooperative behavior by the agent, a behavior tailored to the "needs" of the principal. There is no simple resolution of the e¤ort allocation problem by "market forces".
We should think then about problem-solving as in two people removing a heavy tree from a laneway as an issue in task-sharing and cooperation rather than in textbook "resouce allocation" in a market. Tomasello reports interesting experiments involving two children cooperating in a two-person task, a task analogous to removing a tree from a road. Apes cannot solve the task that three year old children can. The children in fact talk to each other in order to complete the task. We turn to an illustrative two person problem in task-sharing or of joint allocation of e¤ort.
There are two similar men each of whom tends his garden some of the time, expending labor L A L A (person A) and L B L B (person B). Total labor per week available for A and B respectively is L A and L B : These may be di¤erent if say the ages of the two people are quite di¤erent. Garden outputs are then
. a and b translate e¤ort, part of labor supply, into garden ouput. The rest of each person's labor is devoted to bringing home game Q in a joint e¤ort. For inputs L A and L B to the joint hunting activity, quantity Q = L A L B is harvested. This speci…cation implies that some positive amount of labor input from each participant is required if any harvest is to be realized. One textbook representation of an equilibrium allocation of e¤ort here is that person A maximizes his satisfaction from game harvested and garden output, given some arbitrary level of e¤ort by B; while person B does her labor allocation under the assumption that A 0 s labor for hunting is …xed at some arbitrary level. The re…nement of this "solution" is a Cournot equilibrium 13 in which each is assuming the other's labor input for hunting is IN FACT THE ONE THE OTHER PERSON IS ACTUALLY CHOOSING.
14 And so a pair of Cournot hunting e¤ort levels (L A ; L B ) might emerge. It is of course di¢ cult to envisage how such a "co-operative" solution would be arrived at. There are no price signals mediating e¤ort levels here. Certainly neither "partner" can work out a reasonable e¤ort level for hunting without forming a pretty complete picture of what the "partner" is trying to work out. Allocation without prices is often allocation preceded by bargaining or allocation between partners that appear ready to cooperate. Bargaining by two individuals over a …xed pie was formalized by Nash (1950) and his set-up has had a considerable in ‡uence to the present day. So-called ultimatum games have been linked formally to the orginal Nash bargaining framework. Bargaining in these formal frameworks is however generally hard to connect to real-world negotiating, so central a part of human cooperative activity.
When Joan B. Silk (p. 113) writes: "only humans can orchestrate cooperation in large groups of individuals with imperfectly aligned preferences", my mind turns to corporations and armies. These multi-person entities tend to have a single goal (a mission) and the diverse "preferences" of each member of the "team" are suppressed. Members own "preferences" are suppressed by various 1 3 Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), a French engineer, whose idea of equilibrium between "competitors, was inspired by him observing competition in a spring water duopoly. Nash equilibrium in game theory is a Cournot equilibrium within a game theory framework. 1 4 A maximizes u A (Q; C A ) by choice of her hunting input assuming B is selecting level L B and B is maximizing u B (Q; C B ) by choice of her hunting input assuming A is selecting L A : If the (L A ; L B ) pair are in fact those being chosen by the respective partners in their respective maximizations, we have a Cournot equilibrium. means and correct behavior is dictated downwards from the top. Deviations of behavior are met with …rings or court-marshalls. Nevertheless corporations and armies have been and continue to be capable of remarkable joint activities. Ronald Coase 15 emphasized early on that some aspects or resource allocation were more e¤ectively done by dictate within say a corporation instead of left to market mechanisms. In contrast so-called market mechanisms or the market system of decentralized decision-making within a price system does correspond reasonably well to what Silk may have had in mind. The price system orchestrates activities of many individuals in many circumstances reasonably well.
Silk (p. 120) raises the question of a person cooperating even though its interests align imperfectly with others. In the stag hunt she argues the two hunters cooperate because the payo¤ is large and positive for each. The interest of each is "perfectly aligned" with the interest of the other. One can however contemplate a stag hunt with imperfectly aligned preferences and the potential for con ‡ict.
16 She makes the argument that in a multi-person committee, the interest of each member may not be aligned with one or more of the other members and yet members show up and appear to move the agenda of the committee forward. She argues for a second state of preferences. Each member will have her own imperfectly alligned preferences for the meeting to succeed in some sense, but in addition each member can as well have a preference for the committee as an entity to succeed. She suggests that each member is exercising an element of altruism, each is indirectly working for the success of the committee as an entity, somewhat distinct from the committee as a collection of individuals with distinct preferences. She is asking if social activity must include an element of altruism if the full bene…ts of cooperation are to be worked out. This is interesting to speculate about. Is there a point at which a mother stops intervening on behalf of her ill-behaving child as in depleting her fund of altruism in the relationship? Again we ask if the productiveness of cooperation requires some element of altruism in order that the full bene…ts of cooperation get realized? 1 5 Ronald Harry Coase (1910 -2013) was a British economist and author. He was for much of his life the Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago Law School, where he arrived in 1964 and remained for the rest of his life. Coase, who believed economists should study real markets and not theoretical ones, established the case for the corporation as a means to pay the costs of operating a marketplace. In "The Nature of the Firm" (1937), he introduced the concept of transaction costs to explain the nature and limits of …rms.
1 6 The stag hunt is a special two person game in which working co-operatively in a hunt, each player is reward with 100 pounds of meat, whereas in hunting as an isolated individual each agent reaps only 10 pounds of meat (one rabbitt). In a less stylized stag hunt, each player may end up putting out di¤erent e¤ort levels and there could well be disputes, ex post, in dividing up the harvest. With regard to the departure by a villager from acceptable behavior, Tomasello (p. 84) contends that some "very aggressive and acquisitive individuals were weeded out by the group" and were actually killed o¤ by the villagers for not conforming to the norms of acceptable behavior in the village.
Recall that in repeated prisoner's dilemma games, it pays each player to assume initially that she is playing with a cooperator rather than a defector and the full gains from cooperation get realized when cooperation is initially met by cooperation. Maynard-Smith (1982) took up the question earlier of when an initial population of cooperators and defectors would evolve into a population of a single type. He introduced his important notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy in 1972 in his article, "Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting". In reality a "player" can signal her type without playing a pure cooperate move or defect move. Humans can probe their "partners" in order to …nd a degree of cooperativeness or a degree of altuism. Most humans presumably play "partial cooperativeness" and "partial altruism" and what they play is usually speci…c to who the "partner" is and what the characteristics of the situation are. Continuous adjustment in one's cooperativeness tends to make human interaction very complicated to analyze. Repeated interactions do obviously help an interactor to understand the type of "partner" she is dealing with. In a real world game-like interaction, a player is not only playing for a current "prize" but is also playing to establish a reputation. Each "play" represents a signal as well as an action to gain a current payo¤. The mixing of one's plays can represent partial or "variable" cooperation but such behavior is less subtle than the way humans generally communicate their type. Humans have facial expressions, body language and voice variability to assist in communicating their type as in say, a tendency to cooperation rather than to defection.
Concluding Remarks
We have re ‡ected on the manifestation of cooperative behavior in children and asked about how such tendencies may get reinforced and developed over many thousands of years ("evolutionary time"). Our central idea is that division of labor is very common among a wide range of fauna and that this tendency in humans points to a line of social development in humans -speci…cally to mutual support in village defence and to cooperation in big game hunting, as well as to trading between various members of a village. Small capacities for cooperation get enlarged with the reinforcement associated with certain social activities. A sub-theme has been what economics says about cooperative activity. There is an interesting line between arguments supporting self-regulating social behavior in free markets and arguments that essentially represent counter-examples to the free market paradigm. Bargaining, negotiating and contracting are activities outside of the textbook price-system. There is much room for various sorts of cooperation between agents if a whole suite of allocation issues are to be addressed, issues that "the market" cannot mediate satisfactorily. Harari (2014) and others see the e¤ective "harnessing" of generalized cooperative behavior by
